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FUNDING FAITH: THE PAYCHECK
PROTECTION PROGRAM’S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION
BRENNA JEAN O’CONNOR†
INTRODUCTION
In the early months of 2020, COVID-19 had a swift and
profound impact on public health, the economy, state and local
governments, and businesses across the United States.1 In
response, on March 27, 2020, the United States Congress passed
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES
Act”) to protect the American people from the worsening public
health crisis and mitigate the resulting economic downturn.2
Additionally, within the CARES Act, Congress established the
Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), which expanded the Small
Business Administration’s (“SBA”) authority to guarantee
forgivable loans to eligible small businesses.3 Among other
prerequisites, the PPP required qualified small businesses to have
500 or fewer employees.4 As evidenced by the maximum employee
cutoff, the PPP was intended “to keep Main Street open,” preserve
American jobs and employment,5 and subsidize payroll expenses
†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2022, St.
John’s University School of Law; M.A., 2016, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; B.A.,
2015, Loyola University Maryland. For my parents—their unconditional support is
the foundation of my academic accomplishments. I also wish to thank my friends and
family for their constant encouragement throughout my law school career. Finally,
thank you to the editors of the St. John’s Law Review for their insightful suggestions,
careful revisions, and hard work on this Note.
1
See Kelsey Snell, What’s Inside The Senate’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package,
NPR (Mar. 26, 2020, 5:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/26/821457551/whats-insidethe-senate-s-2-trillion-coronavirus-aid-package [https://perma.cc/Q6T6-58CT].
2
Id.
3
See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., LSB10445, ELIGIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE CARES ACT’S PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 1
(2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10445
[https://perma.cc/9KZG-W7RC].
4
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No.
116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 288 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 9001 et. seq.
(West 2021)).
5
Reese Dunklin & Michael Rezendes, Catholic Church Lobbied for Taxpayer
Funds,
Got
$1.4B,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(July
10,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/dab8261c68c93f24c0bfc1876518b3f6 [https://perma.cc/C9STRKPN].
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for those small businesses that were devastated by the economic
shutdown.6 The PPP loans could be used for payroll costs, as well
as rent, utilities, and interest on mortgage payments.7 To qualify
for forgiveness, at least sixty percent must have been used for
payroll expenses..8
Through the PPP, Congress modified the eligibility
requirements for SBA loans from solely small, for-profit
businesses to include nonprofit organizations.9 The PPP was
silent, however, as to whether faith-based nonprofit organizations
were incorporated within those revised eligibility requirements.10
As a result, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops lobbied the
federal government so that Catholic parishes across the country
would qualify.11 Following the initial uncertainty concerning
nonprofit religious organizations’ eligibility, on April 3, 2020, the
SBA released an FAQ document signifying that, “notwithstanding
any regulations to the contrary,” faith-based organizations,
including churches, could receive forgivable loans under the PPP.12
The SBA unilaterally asserted that “no otherwise eligible
organization” would be disqualified from receiving a loan due to
its “religious nature, religious identity, or religious speech.”13
Prior to this guidance on religious organizations’ eligibility, the
SBA had explicitly excluded organizations primarily tasked with

6
Michelle Boorstein, The Stimulus Package Will Cover Clergy Salaries. Some Say
the Government Has Gone Too Far., WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:15 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/04/10/cares-act-paycheck-protectionchurches-salaries-coronavirus.
7
§ 1102, 134 Stat. at 290.
8
U.S.
SMALL
BUS.
ADMIN.,
PPP
LOAN
FORGIVENESS,
https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/covid-19-relief-options/paycheckprotection-program/ppp-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/GQL5-KVJJ] (last visited
June 12, 2022).
9
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 2; see § 1102, 134 Stat. at 286 (“[T]he term ‘nonprofit
organization’ means an organization that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that is exempt from taxation under section 501(a)
of such Code.”).
10
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 2.
11
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5. For example, “the Los Angeles archdiocese,
whose leader heads the bishops’ conference, paid $20,000 to lobby the U.S. Senate and
House” to include religious organizations in the category of eligible nonprofits under
the PPP. Id.
12
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 2.
13
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING
PARTICIPATION OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION
PROGRAM (PPP) AND THE ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM (EIDL) 1
(2020),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/SBA%20FaithBased%20FAQ%20Final-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/U92S-VYJG].
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“teaching, instructing, counseling, or indoctrinating religion or
religious beliefs, whether in a religious or secular setting” from
receiving governmental loans, repeatedly citing Establishment
Clause concerns.14
Additionally, the SBA’s FAQ guidance and an interim final
rule amended the affiliation requirements for small businesses
and nonprofits, which govern when one organization is regarded
as “affiliated” with another for purposes of calculating whether the
With little
organization has 500 or fewer employees.15
explanation, the SBA stated that it would exempt institutions that
typically would be subject to its affiliation rules if those
organizations’ connections with other entities were “based on a
religious teaching or belief” or were “otherwise a part of the
exercise of religion.”16
The SBA had the Catholic Church and its associated entities
in mind when it modified the affiliation rules and created the
religious exemption.17 Indeed, the SBA’s guidance included an
illustration of this new religious exemption using a local diocese
as its principal example.18 Without this exception, “many Catholic
dioceses would have [remained] ineligible because . . . between
their head offices, parishes and other affiliates,” their employees
surpassed the “500-person cap.”19 The SBA thus established the
eligibility of networks of churches with considerably more than
500 employees for PPP loans.20
The SBA further stipulated that religious organizations were
“eligible to receive SBA loans regardless of whether they provide

14

BRANNON, supra note 3, at 1.
See id. at 2–3.
16
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 13, at 3–4; see also Business Loan Program
Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20817, 20820 (Apr.
15, 2020) (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(b)(10) (2021)).
17
See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 13, at 3–4.
18
Id. The question presented in the SBA’s FAQ document was: “Is my faith-based
organization disqualified from any SBA loan programs because it is affiliated with
other faith-based organizations, such as a local diocese?” Id. at 3. The SBA provided
the following answer to that question: “Not necessarily . . . . For example, if your faithbased organization affiliates with another organization because of your organization’s
religious beliefs about church authority or internal constitution . . . your organization
would qualify for the exemption.” Id. at 3–4.
19
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5.
20
See Micah Schwartzman et al., The Separation of Church and State Is Breaking
(June
29,
2020),
Down
Under
Trump,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/breakdown-church-andstate/613498 [https://perma.cc/8JW4-7UUJ].
15
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secular social services.”21 Finally, the SBA took an extraordinary
step and declared that PPP loans were to be “used to pay the
salaries of ministers and other staff engaged in the religious
mission of institutions.”22 Churches, synagogues, and other
religious institutions around the country subsequently applied for
the loans and collectively received up to $10 billion under the
PPP.23
Catholic dioceses across the country promoted the PPP and
shepherded resources to help affiliates navigate the loan’s
application process.24 Although the Department of the Treasury
did not originally disclose the exact monetary amounts of the
loans,25 the Department has since released detailed data about
loan recipients and the funding they acquired under the PPP.26
The most recent reports establish that, for example, the Trustees
of St. Patrick’s Cathedral on Fifth Avenue in New York City
received $1,808,777.27 Additionally, the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Brooklyn received $2,388,907.28 The Archdiocese of New York
received $7,735,890,29 though other estimates suggest that the
Archdiocese received fifteen loans, reaching at least $28 million.30
Under the PPP, the U.S. Catholic Church was approved for at least
3,500 forgivable loans, totaling between $1.4 and $3.5 billion.31

21

U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
23
Tom Gjelten, Religious Groups Received $6-10 Billion in COVID-19 Relief
Funds,
Hope
for
More,
NPR
(Aug.
3,
2020,
6:57
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/08/03/898753550/
religious-groups-received-6-10-billion-in-covid-19-relief-funds-hope-for-more
[https://perma.cc/7SNS-UBJV].
24
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5.
25
Yonat Shimron, Federal Loans for Small Businesses Went to Thousands of
Churches and Other Religious Organizations, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020, 4:49 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/federal-loans-for-small-businesses-wentto-thousands-of-churches-and-other-religious-organizations/2020/07/10/da79ba8ac244-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html. Rather than indicating the specific amount
of funding that each entity received, the initial release “broke down the data into five
broad ranges or tiers: $150,000 to $350,000; $350,000 to $1 million; $1 million to $2
million; $2 million to $5 million; and $5 million to $10 million.” Id.
26
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PPP DATA, https://www.sba.gov/fundingprograms/loans/covid-19-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program/ppp-data
[https://perma.cc/8QTV-MANZ] (last visited June 29, 2022).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5.
31
Id.
22
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This Note argues that the SBA’s dispensation of between $1.4
and $3.5 billion in taxpayer money to the U.S. Catholic Church—
explicitly to pay for clergy and religious staff’s salaries—
exemplifies a quintessential Establishment Clause violation, and,
accordingly, was likely unconstitutional.
Part I examines the historical basis of the Establishment
Clause and demonstrates that the Framers’ principal concern was
to eliminate and prohibit church taxes, which they viewed as
infringements on freedom of conscience and religious liberty. Part
II traces the Supreme Court’s modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and posits that while the Court has increasingly
embraced a permissive approach to providing governmental
financial assistance to religious institutions, it nevertheless
requires that such funding be restricted to only secular use.
Therefore, the government may not finance essentially religious
endeavors. Finally, Part III argues that the government’s
dispensation of billions of taxpayers’ dollars to the U.S. Catholic
Church for the purpose of funding clergy members’ salaries under
the PPP not only contravenes the historical basis of the
Establishment Clause but is distinguishable from all modern
church-state Supreme Court decisions. The PPP funding provided
to churches is a clear example of an Establishment Clause
violation.32
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A.

Overview

The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, requiring that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion”33 is not self-explanatory; rather, it must be deciphered.34
However, divergent approaches to constitutional analysis advance
a variety of “interpretative guidelines.”35 As a result, the Supreme
32
This Note acknowledges that the issue of taxpayer standing would likely arise
if parties pursued lawsuits with respect to PPP funding provided to religious
organizations. However, the issue of taxpayer standing is outside the scope of this
Note. For a comprehensive analysis of taxpayer standing to challenge perceived
Establishment Clause encroachments, see generally Case Comment, Taxpayer
Standing—Establishment Clause Violations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 325 (2007).
33
U.S. CONST. amend I.
34
Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and the Establishment
Clause, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 623 (2019).
35
Id.
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Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as a whole,
is “in shambles”36—it is both profoundly contradictory and almost
irreparably confused.37 There is no discernable consensus among
the Justices regarding the appropriate doctrinal methods
employed to evaluate Establishment Clause issues involving
governmental financial assistance to religious institutions.38
Individual Justices hold opposing views on the meaning of the
Establishment Clause,39 and the Court has never settled on one
mode of interpretation “without exceptions.”40 Additionally,
compared to other constitutional issues addressed by the Court,
the invocation of the Founding Fathers is “unparalleled” in the
Court’s modern church-state decisions.41 Thus, to attain clarity in
interpreting the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
regarding governmental assistance to religious organizations, a
review of the historical context of the Establishment Clause is
essential.

36

Neil Joseph, Let History Repeat Itself: Solving Originalism’s History Problem
in Interpreting the Establishment Clause, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
1, 1 (2020) (quoting Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists, Inc. 132 S. Ct.
12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
37
Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006).
38
Id. Gey contended that “[o]n a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even
settle on one standard to apply in all Establishment Clause cases. At some point
during the last ten years, one or more of the nine Justices have articulated ten
different Establishment Clause standards.” Id. Additionally, for a recent illustration
of this discord on the Court, see generally the Court’s most recent church-state
decision, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020). There,
in addition to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, three Justices issued separate
concurrences, and three Justices issued separate dissents. Id. The number of separate
opinions alone is perhaps indicative of the apparent lack of consensus among the
Justices regarding how to examine issues regarding financial assistance to religious
organizations.
39
See Gey, supra note 37, at 725.
40
Douglas Laycock, Why the Supreme Court Changed Its Mind About Government
Aid to Religious Institutions: It’s a Lot More than Just Republican Appointments, 2008
BYU L. REV. 275, 278–79 (2008).
41
Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and
the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 585 (2006); see also
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 99 (2002). Dreisbach asserted that “[h]istorians and jurists, not
surprisingly, have been drawn to the saga of church and state . . . ‘because the sources
are uniquely ample, the struggle was important and dramatic, and the opinions of
Madison, the principal framer of the First Amendment, and of Jefferson are fully
elicited.’ ” Id.
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The Precarious Historical Foundation of the “Wall of
Separation” and No-Aid Strict Separationism

Since the Supreme Court of the United States decided Everson
v. Board of Education, many have assumed that the Framers
believed government to be categorically “forbidden from forcing
taxpayers to subsidize religious activity.”42 In Everson, which is
widely considered to be the bedrock of modern Establishment
Clause doctrine,43 Justice Hugo Black referenced Thomas
Jefferson’s and James Madison’s arguments for religious freedom
at the time of the founding44 to support the conclusion that the
Establishment Clause “forbids forcing citizens to pay for religion
they oppose.”45 For example, Justice Black invoked a metaphor
attributed to Thomas Jefferson, averring that “the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between Church and State.’ ”46
Justice Black
additionally proffered Jefferson’s contention “that to compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”47
The majority opinion also paraphrased James Madison’s
arguments in favor of religious liberties and asserted that citizens
should not be taxed to provide financial support for any religious
institutions.48 Based on these historical sentiments, Justice Black
determined that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions.”49
Following Everson, many accepted Jefferson’s “wall of separation”
42
Mark Storslee, Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the
Establishment Clause, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 117 (2020).
43
David E. Steinberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Establishment Clause Federalism, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 309 (2013).
44
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947); but see Steinberg, supra
note 43, at 309, 310 (critiquing the Everson Court’s historical research).
45
Storslee, supra note 42, at 112.
46
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
47
Id. at 13 (quoting the preamble of Thomas Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom). See also Thomas Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786),
ENCYC. VA. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/an-act-for-establishingreligious-freedom-1786 [https://perma.cc/Q33P-VYRX].
48
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11–12. Justice Black noted that in James Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison “eloquently argued that a true religion did not
need the support of law; that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be
taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society
required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions
were the inevitable result of government-established religions.” Id.
49
Id. at 16.
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as “an authoritative expression of the First Amendment,”50 which
fundamentally shaped the no-aid strict separationist approach to
Establishment Clause interpretation.51
However, legal scholars have rightly criticized the Everson
Court for a variety of reasons,52 including its misplaced reliance on
Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor.53 First, Jefferson only
used the phrase “wall of separation” in a private letter that he
wrote in 1802,54 nearly a decade after the Establishment Clause
was ratified.55 Additionally, Jefferson did not participate in
drafting the Bill of Rights—Madison was the principal draftsman
of the First Amendment.56 Accordingly, scholars have asserted
that “Jefferson’s views” regarding the “wall of separation” are
“clearly a post hoc gloss on the constitutional text by an individual”
who neither drafted the text nor ratified the final version of the
First Amendment, and cannot properly be applied to analyzing
Establishment Clause claims.57

50

DREISBACH, supra note 41, at 17.
See Daniel L. Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the
American Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMORY L.J. 223, 224 (2000) (“The most
enduring legacy of Everson v. Board of Education—more important than the legal
holding—is the lavish use of strict separationist rhetoric in both the majority and
minority opinions.”).
52
See Steinberg, supra note 43, at 311. In Everson, “Justice Black’s highly
selective discussion of historical documents” led to a “badly compromised historical
account.” Id.
53
Id. at 302–03 (“The Supreme Court erred by taking Jefferson’s metaphorical
wall out of context, and then using this wall as a basis for regulating relationships
between state governments and religion.”); see DREISBACH, supra note 41, at 98; see
also Douglas G. Smith, Thomas Jefferson’s Retrospective on the Establishment Clause,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 378 (2003) (reviewing DREISBACH, supra note 41).
54
DREISBACH, supra note 41, at 17.
55
“The Establishment Clause was ratified on December 15, 1791.” Storslee, supra
note 42, at 163.
56
DREISBACH, supra note 41, at 99. Jefferson’s “letter’s elevation to virtual
constitutional status [is] surprising, because, as the American Minister to France from
1785 to 1789, Jefferson participated in neither the Constitutional Convention nor the
First Federal Congress.” Id. at 98. Additionally, the “First Congress debated the
content of [what] came to be known as the First Amendment, in the summer of 1789
and approved the final text in September; Jefferson returned to American shores in
November 1789.” Id. at 98–99.
57
Smith, supra note 53, at 378; see DREISBACH, supra note 41, at 99 (Jefferson’s
“influence on the actual text of the First Amendment was at most indirect”); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 933, 939 (1986) (“Exponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many
breaches in the wall of separation countenanced by those who adopted the [F]irst
[A]mendment”).
51
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Scholars have subsequently denounced Everson for its
resulting strict separationist approach58 and the “no-aid” theory.59
Those jurists and scholars who subscribe to the no-aid strict
separationist approach contend that the Establishment Clause
proscribes nearly all forms of governmental assistance to religious
institutions.60 However, in many respects, the strict separationist
approach—built on that “wall of separation” between church and
state—was inconsistent with the founding generation’s
understanding of religious freedom, which never required the
complete detachment of the religious from the secular.61 On the
contrary, religion was “deeply intertwined” with founding-era
American culture.62 Indeed, during the Age of Enlightenment,63
freedom of religion was rooted in a nearly unwavering belief in
freedom of conscience.64
The Founders considered religion to be the expression of
beliefs that were dictated by conscience, and understood freedom
of
conscience
as
a
“distinctly
rational
process . . . involv[ing] . . . human
reason,
judgment,
and
understanding.”65 Additionally, those in the founding generation
believed that freedom of conscience was the underpinning of the
“moral principles on which civil society and republican
governmental systems depended.”66 Freedom of conscience was

58
See Steinberg, supra note 43, at 303; McConnell, supra note 57, at 933–34 (“One
no longer can maintain . . . that the Framers originally intended the religion clauses
‘to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and
civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion.’ ”) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)).
59
See Storslee, supra note 42, at 183–84.
60
Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism
and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285, 288
n.13 (1999).
61
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular:
A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837,
844–45, 873 (1995).
62
Id. at 960.
63
Because an examination of freedom of conscience falls outside the parameters
of this Note, for a comprehensive analysis of several philosophers’ influence on
eighteenth-century American thought and John Locke’s foundational contribution to
freedom of conscience applied to religious liberty, see generally Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002).
64
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 893 (“It has been written that at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, the idea of freedom of conscience knew no
opposition.”).
65
Id. at 893, 919.
66
Id. at 956.
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critical to religious freedom, both from a practical standpoint as
well as for the fundamental “protection of the very process of
religious belief and conviction.”67 Thus, freedom of conscience was
the primary concern among the Framers, who were intent on
safeguarding religious liberties,68 and who believed that “[o]nly
conscience, rooted in transcendent moral or religious
values . . . could provide . . . for the survival of government by the
people.”69
The determination to prevent a merger between
governmental and religious institutions represented the marked
exception to the general acceptance of the interconnectedness of
the secular and the religious in early America.70 The conception of
the Establishment Clause—intended to limit the government’s
ability to interact or blend with religious institutions—was “a
testament” to the founding generation’s conviction that freedom of
religion, rooted in freedom of conscience, demanded paramount
protections.71 The Framers believed that religious institutions
represented fundamental manifestations of religious freedom and
were necessary for the inculcation of moral values.72 Nevertheless,
the Framers cautioned that the fusion between those independent
religious institutions and the government—creating an
establishment73—could weaken freedom of religion in the young
republic and destroy “the very freedom of conscience that their
existence represented.”74 Nowhere was this more evident than in
the prohibition of financial assistance to religious institutions in
the form of church taxes.75

67

Id. at 894.
Id. at 844 (“The religious freedom that was the core of concern at the time was
freedom of conscience; its preservation represented the highest common factor of
agreement among anti-clericalists (such as Jefferson and Madison) and those
composing other parts of the religious and political spectra.”).
69
Id. at 912.
70
Id. at 845.
71
See id. at 848.
72
Id. at 959.
73
See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131 (2003)
(“An establishment is the promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through
governmental authority.”).
74
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 959.
75
Storslee, supra note 42, at 127; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 930
(“Whatever the particular intentions of the framers of this document, it is clear that
an ‘establishment,’ in the general understanding of the time, encompassed any tax
monies given directly to a religious institution, whether designated by the state or by
the taxpayer’s choice.”).
68
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Ardent proponents of religious liberty opposed church taxes
because the taxes constituted state-mandated “coerced religious
observance[s]” that directly contravened ideas of religious
freedom.76 Leaders in the founding era viewed these taxes as
“compelled sacrifice[s] to God,” as the monies were “taken by force,
solely to finance the religious function of ministers and
churches.”77 The taxes were collected “to support religious worship
by paying for clergy salaries and church buildings.”78 Where
“individual conviction” was the central facet of religious faith,79
church taxes “deprived citizens of the right to worship only as they
wished,” as directed by their consciences.80 Therefore, constraints
on religious exercise were restrictions on “freedom of conscience
itself.”81
In James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, he forcefully argued against church taxes
and wrote that religion “must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man.”82 Moreover, he argued that “in matters
of [r]eligion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society” and religion should be “wholly exempt from its
cognizance.”83 Accordingly, Madison contended that a system
which compels the payment of religious taxes is only slightly
removed from a system which induces conformity with specific
religious worship.84 As Madison and his contemporaries advocated
for religious liberties, they focused on “compelled worship, not
compelled subsidy” in their objections to church taxes.85 If the
government could implement a church tax, even one as
insignificant as three pence, the “government could mandate any
act of religious worship,” and that was an impermissible
encroachment on religious freedom, vis-à-vis freedom of
conscience.86

76

Storslee, supra note 42, at 126.
Id. at 118.
78
Id. at 121.
79
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 945–46.
80
Storslee, supra note 42, at 125.
81
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 919.
82
James Madison, To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), reprinted in JAMES MADISON,
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21, 22 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
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Id at 22.
84
See id. at 23.
85
Storslee, supra note 42, at 127.
86
Id. at 125–26.
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While many leaders of the founding generation opposed
financial assistance to churches in the form of coerced church
taxes, they did not object to government funding of religious
schools.87
Indeed, the Founders identified a discernable
distinction between church taxes, which were exceptional efforts
to finance religious worship,88 and taxes used to fund and support
religious schools.89 It was a common practice for governments to
provide financial assistance to religious schools through tax money
because those funds advanced a public good—education.90 The
government could financially support education because, as an
institution, education aimed to enhance various other “goods that
governments” were, in fact, “created to protect,” including
“personal security” and “material prosperity.”91
The historical evidence thus lends itself to finding that “high
and impregnable”92 wall between churches, as such, and state.
Taxes supporting clergy salaries and the religious functioning of
churches constituted an impermissible breach of that wall.93
However, the historical evidence further demonstrates that the
founding generation overwhelmingly approved of providing
taxpayer funds to certain religious institutions, such as schools.94
Accordingly, the Everson Court erred in reading the historical
accounts that were opposed to church taxes as unqualified
objections to subsidizing religious organizations.95
II. THE MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
A.

Overview

Over the past several decades, as the Court has moved away
from no-aid separationism and increasingly toward a principle of
neutrality, it has not explained how its present approach to

87
Id. at 129. While an in-depth examination of tax monies directed to religious
schools during the founding era is outside the scope of this Note, see generally id. at
150–69 for a thorough analysis of early American financial support for religious
schools in nearly every state, as well as at the federal level.
88
Id. at 133.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 150.
91
Id. at 132.
92
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
93
See Storslee, supra note 42, at 118.
94
See id. at 150.
95
See id. at 117, 126.
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evaluating funding programs under the Establishment Clause
comports with either Everson’s historical account or “with
Founding-era history.”96 It appears, however, that like the
Framers, the Court has implicitly perceived a discrete distinction
between the government offering funding to support explicitly
religious activities and providing financial assistance for public
goods, like education.97 Noticeably absent from the Court’s
jurisprudence are cases involving government funding used to
subsidize clergy salaries and church functions.98 Instead, the
funding disputes in the collection of cases since Everson focus
almost exclusively on neutrally offered governmental funding,
provided either directly or indirectly to religious schools.99
Moreover, in these cases, the organizations that received
governmental assistance offered a “service that [could] be provided
either by religious or secular organizations,” and "[u]sually,” the
supported activity was “mostly or entirely secular even when
provided by a church.”100
B.

The Caveat: Secular Uses Only

The Everson Court constructed the no-aid strict separationist
approach for analyzing governmental financial assistance to
religious schools on an unstable foundation.101 Indeed, in the
paragraph following Justice Black’s contention that contributing
any tax-raised funds to support an institution “which teaches the
96

Id. at 115.
See id. at 119 (footnote omitted) (“Members of the Founding generation who
opposed church taxes did not object to funding religious schools. On the contrary,
foreshadowing cases like Espinoza, many of them argued that refusing to fund certain
schools because of their religious activity was a form of discrimination, and their
fellow citizens agreed. On this view, government was not forbidden from providing
funds to religious entities in pursuit of public goods. Rather, it was forbidden from
taking religion into account—either by extracting funds solely to finance a recipient’s
religion, or by denying funds where the sole reason for doing so was disapproval of a
recipient’s religion.”).
98
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 4.
99
Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?,
131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 143 (2017) (contending that these cases have involved “funding
of some broader category of private activity—medical care, social services, education,
or . . . playground surfaces”).
100
Id.
101
See Steinberg, supra note 43, at 311 (“Whatever the reason for Justice Black’s
highly selective discussion of historical documents, the result is a badly compromised
historical account.”); Laycock, supra note 99, at 138 (“The Court has never
acknowledged the conflict between . . . [the no-funding principle and the
nondiscrimination principle], but it has struggled with that conflict for seventy
years.”).
97
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tenets and faith of any church” violated the Establishment Clause,
the Court nevertheless decided the case on the basis of
nondiscrimination.102 The Everson Court held that no state could
“exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”103 The
absolute prohibition of financial assistance to religious schools
was, therefore, “never true, not even in Everson itself.”104
Lemon v. Kurtzman was likely the closest realization of the
no-aid strict separationist approach.105 There, the Court invoked
the belief in an alleged “long political tradition of no aid”106 to
invalidate a financial assistance program designed to support
teachers’ salaries at a religious school.107 Nevertheless, the Court
asserted that “the line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.”108 After Lemon, the
Court capitalized on this “blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier”
between religious schools and the government, and shifted toward
the viewpoint that “government funding of secular services,
including education, can flow to religious providers so long as it is
distributed in religiously neutral ways.”109
Everson’s “nondiscrimination principle,” based on neutrality
toward and among religions, has overtaken its “no-aid principle”
for issues involving governmental financial assistance provided to
religious schools.110 For example, in Mitchell v. Helms, a plurality
of the Court applied a dismantled Lemon test111 to conclude that
religious schools could receive federal aid as long as they put the
funding toward “secular, neutral, and nonideological” uses.112 In
102

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Id.
104
Laycock, supra note 99, at 137–38.
105
Id. at 138–39; see also Laycock, supra note 40, at 277.
106
Laycock, supra note 99, at 138–39.
107
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
108
Id. at 614.
109
Id.; Laycock, supra note 99, at 140.
110
Laycock, supra note 99, at 140.
111
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (citations omitted) (“[I]n
Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined
only the first and second factors. We acknowledged that our cases discussing excessive
entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had our cases
discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon’s entanglement inquiry as
simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect.”).
112
Id. at 831, 861.
103
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reaching this conclusion, the plurality examined neither the first
prong nor the third prong 113 of the Lemon test.114 Instead, the
Mitchell plurality relied exclusively on a redefined second prong of
the Lemon test115 and considered whether the government
financial aid program “ha[d] the effect of advancing religion” using
three factors: whether the aid (1) “result[ed] in “governmental
indoctrination,” (2) “define[d] its recipients by reference to
religion,” or (3) “create[d] an excessive entanglement.”116
The Court emphasized the principle of neutrality when
considering the indoctrination element and indicated that it would
uphold financial assistance programs that “offered [aid] to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion.”117 The
Court continued, holding that “[i]f the religious, irreligious, and
areligious” were all eligible for governmental financial aid, it
would be unlikely for anyone to presume that the government
itself had conducted “any indoctrination.”118 Justice O’Connor’s
controlling concurrence, however, required aid that was “delivered
directly from the government to the school”119 be put only toward
secular uses.120
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court reduced what little
remained of the Lemon test for governmental financial assistance
issues “to a broad neutrality requirement.”121 There, the Court
held that a governmental funding program was not subject to
challenges under the Establishment Clause because it was
“neutral with respect to religion” and “provide[d] assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who,” according to their “own
genuine and independent private choice,” decided to direct the
governmental financial aid to religious schools.122
Zelman
encapsulated the distinction between direct and indirect financial

113
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (“Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; . . . finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’ ”).
114
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807–08.
115
See id. at 612 (The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute’s
“principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”).
116
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
117
Id. at 809.
118
Id.
119
Laycock, supra note 99, at 141.
120
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 831.
121
Gey, supra note 37, at 732.
122
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
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assistance programs to religious schools.123 The government’s role
ended with the disbursements of the benefits—any incidental
advancement of a religious message would be attributable only to
the individual recipients of the aid, not the government.124 Again,
the Court decided that the Establishment Clause was not offended
by neutral government aid programs which supported religious
schools.125
Contrastingly, in Locke v. Davey, the Court upheld a statute
that prohibited a recipient of a state-subsidized scholarship from
using the funding to pursue a degree in devotional theology.126
Locke foremost involved a Free Exercise challenge, but due to
frequent tension between the Religion Clauses, the Court
acknowledged that the Establishment Clause was also
implicated.127 The Court stated that “there is room for play in the
joints” between the Religion Clauses because actions that may be
permitted by the Establishment Clause may not likewise be
required under the Free Exercise Clause.128
Relying on historical evidence, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that most states in the founding era intended to “avoid an
establishment of religion” by including “prohibitions against using
tax funds to support the ministry” in their constitutions.129
Additionally, the Chief Justice asserted that a plain reading of
those constitutional provisions demonstrated that they
“prohibited any tax dollars from supporting the clergy.”130 Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that early state constitutions approved
of “explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state
dollars,” which strengthened the Court’s contention “that religious
instruction” is inherently “different” in character.131 Thus, the
Court rejected the argument that because the scholarship program
“fund[ed] training for . . . secular professions, . . . the State must
also fund training for religious professions.”132 In contrast to
providing education and training for a secular profession,

123

See Laycock, supra note 99, at 153; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652–53.
125
Id. at 662–63.
126
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004).
127
Id. at 718–19.
128
Id. at 718–20 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970)).
129
Locke, 540 U.S. at 722–23.
130
Id. at 723.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 721.
124
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“[t]raining someone to lead a congregation [was] an essentially
religious endeavor.”133 The Court further asserted that since the
nation’s founding, “there have been popular uprisings against
procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was
one of the hallmarks of an ‘established’ religion.”134 Therefore, the
Court determined that, given the significant historic interests at
issue, a state could refuse to provide taxpayer-based funding for
explicitly religious uses, such as training to join the ministry.135
The Court distinguished Locke in Trinity Lutheran Church v.
Comer based on the secular use of the taxpayer money in the
particular funding program at issue.136 Chief Justice Roberts
contended that in Locke, the scholarship recipient was denied such
funding “not . . . because of who he was,” but “because of what he
proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”137 The
Chief Justice stated that “there is no question that Trinity
Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a
church.”138 Similar to Locke, Trinity Lutheran involved a Free
The Court nevertheless referenced the
Exercise claim.139
Establishment Clause issue, albeit briefly, in a footnote, stating:
“This case involves express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not
address religious uses of funding.”140
Accordingly, without
exploring the “uses” of the funding at issue, the Court implicitly
affirmed that when providing funding to religious schools, or even
a church that runs a pre-school, the aid must be “restrict[ed] . . . to
secular uses.”141
Unlike training for the ministry, playground resurfacing did
not involve an “essentially religious endeavor”; rather, the
resurfacing program supported an unquestionably secular

133

Id.
Id. at 722.
135
Id. at 725.
136
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022–23 (2017).
137
Id. at 2023.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 2019; Corbin, supra note 34, at 641 (“Although Trinity Lutheran Church
brought a Free Exercise Clause claim, the government’s defense was establishmentbased.”); Kermit V. Lipez, Reflections on the Church/State Puzzle, 72 ME. L. REV. 325,
335 (2020) (noting that Trinity Lutheran was a Free Exercise case with Establishment
Clause implications).
140
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3.
141
Storslee, supra note 42, at 114 (“Under current doctrine, government may
provide money directly to churches and religious schools that deliver secular goods so
long as it restricts the aid to secular uses.”).
134
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activity.142 The limited “focus on something so secular as
playgrounds and the safety of children” also perhaps explains the
Court’s 7-2 decision to uphold the funding program.143 The Court’s
holding thus endorsed the underlying requirement that
governmental funding provided to religious institutions must be
used for “some activity that falls within a neutrally funded secular
category.”144
Everson’s progeny demonstrate that the Court has
“essentially abandoned any effort to separate church and state”
when evaluating issues surrounding governmental financial
assistance to religious organizations such as schools.145 However,
the Court has left “open the possibility [that] a useful distinction”
may still be “drawn between laws that discriminate on the basis of
religious status and religious use.”146 The Court relied on such a
distinction in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.147 In
Espinoza, as in Trinity Lutheran before it, the Court first
distinguished Locke, noting that there was neither an “essentially
religious endeavor,” nor a “historic and substantial” interest at
issue in the funding program.148 Espinoza was deemed more
analogous to Trinity Lutheran and, therefore, “the proper
resolution of Espinoza was a straightforward application of Trinity
Lutheran.”149
The Court contended that, like Trinity Lutheran, where the
majority held that the funding policy impermissibly
“discriminated ‘based on religious identity,’ ” Espinoza also

142
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (citation omitted) (quoting Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004)) (“The claimant in Locke sought funding for an
‘essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well as an academic
pursuit,’ and opposition to such funding ‘to support church leaders’ lay at the historic
core of the Religion Clauses. Here nothing of the sort can be said about a program to
use recycled tires to resurface playgrounds.”).
143
Laycock, supra note 99, at 133.
144
Id. at 157.
145
Gey, supra note 37, at 726.
146
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Laycock, supra
note 99, at 157 (“Footnote 3 reserves the question of religious uses . . . . [r]eligious
schools may or may not become eligible for direct funding, and if they do, the money
may or may not have to be segregated and restricted to secular uses.”).
147
Stephanie H. Barclay, Unentangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701,
1713–14 (2020) (“In its recent Espinoza decision, the Court based its decision
requiring public support for a religious school on a distinction between religious status
and religious use.”).
148
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2257–58 (2020).
149
Michael Bindas, The Status of Use-Based Exclusions & Educational Choice
After Espinoza, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 204, 208 (2020).
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“turn[ed] expressly on religious status and not religious use.”150
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that a state “cannot disqualify
some private schools solely because they are religious.”151 The
word “solely” incorporated the Chief Justice’s reliance on the
distinction between religious status and religious use.152 While
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that other Justices
questioned the utility of the status-use distinction,153 he
nevertheless concluded that the Court need not further examine it
because
under
Trinity
Lutheran,
“such
status-based
discrimination is subject to ‘the strictest scrutiny.’ ”154
Although “jurisprudence grounded on a status-use
distinction” may lead to “more questions than answers,”155 even
those Justices who were skeptical of the line between religious
status and religious use acknowledged its continued existence.156
The Chief Justice’s explicit reliance on the status-use distinction,
as well as his reluctance to elaborate on or analyze the religious
use of the funding, affirmed the status-use distinction’s place in
the Court’s current church-state doctrine.157 The possibility that
the government may preclude taxpayer funds from being put to
fundamentally religious use remains.158 Therefore, while the
neutrality approach reigns when determining whether religious
150

Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255–56.
Id. at 2261.
152
Lipez, supra note 139, at 374–75 (arguing that the “distinction in Espinoza [is]
not new”).
153
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257. Chief Justice Roberts cited Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence in Trinity Lutheran, in which Justice Gorsuch noted that he “harbor[ed]
doubts about the stability of such a line.” Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S.
Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch continued: “Is it a
religious group that built the playground? Or did a group build the playground so it
might be used to advance a religious mission? The distinction blurs in much the same
way the line between acts and omissions can blur when stared at too long.” Id.
154
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
155
Id. at 2275 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
156
See id. (citation omitted) (“The Court characterizes the Montana Constitution
as discriminating against parents and schools based on ‘religious status and not
religious use.’ No doubt, the Court proceeds as it does to underscore how the outcome
of this case follows from Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, where
the Court struck down a similar public benefits restriction that, it held, discriminated
on the basis of religious status.”); id. at 2285 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Even if the
schools’ status were relevant, I do not see what bearing the majority’s distinction could
have here.”).
157
Lipez, supra note 139, at 375–76. In Espinoza, Chief Justice Roberts remained
“notably circumspect about the meaning of the status/use distinction,” and
consequently, “the ultimate significance of the distinction will only become clear with
future litigation.” Id.
158
Barclay, supra note 147, at 1713–14.
151
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organizations are eligible to receive financial assistance, the
government may not provide taxpayer funding to religious
institutions in support of inherently religious activities without
violating the Establishment Clause.159
III. THE PPP LOANS PROVIDED TO SUBSIDIZE CLERGY SALARIES
LIKELY VIOLATED THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
It is manifestly unclear whether or how the SBA’s guidance
for disbursement of PPP loans to religious organizations comports
with either the relevant historical evidence or the modern Court’s
interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause.160
The PPP’s stated purpose was to cover payroll expenses, including
that of clergy and “other staff engaged in the religious mission of
institutions.”161 Notwithstanding the various ways in which a
recipient could use the PPP funding,162 in order for the government
to eventually forgive the loans, at least sixty percent of the loan
was required to go toward salary payments.163 However, the SBA’s
contention that the PPP loans could be used to pay clergy
members’ salaries is likely impermissible under the
Establishment Clause.164
Directing taxpayer money either to one established church or
to all churches to be shared on some neutral basis to finance
religion represents the quintessential Establishment Clause
violation that the founding generation contemplated centuries
ago.165 Taxpayer money provided through the PPP to churches is
not synonymous with the church taxes that the Framers
prohibited in pursuit of religious liberty. However, the method
through which the taxes were collected and disbursed does not
appear to be the controlling element.166 That the funds dispensed
under the PPP were from a general, federal tax fund and not
earmarked for religious entities at collection should not be
159

See Laycock, supra note 99, at 157.
Nelson Tebbe et al., The Quiet Demise of the Separation of Church and State,
N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/opinion/usconstitution-church-state.html (“Now the core constitutional rule against using
taxpayer dollars to pay clergy is slipping away in [the] face of the coronavirus crisis.”).
161
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 13, at 1–2.
162
See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L.
No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 288 (2020); (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 9001 et.
seq. (West 2021)).
163
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
164
Tebbe et al., supra note 160.
165
Laycock, supra note 99, at 143.
166
See Storslee, supra note 42, at 170.
160
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regarded as dispositive evidence of the PPP’s constitutionality.167
What ultimately mattered for the Founders was the redistribution
of taxes “for the purpose of financing religious functions.”168 The
PPP directly contradicts this fundamental component of the
Establishment Clause. The Framers settled the debate of
providing taxpayer money to churches—government funding for
the religious functioning of churches, and specifically clergy
salaries, is unconstitutional.169
A grounding principle in modern Supreme Court precedent for
government financial assistance cases is the requirement that
when taxpayer funding is offered on religiously neutral criteria,
religious organizations must put that money to “secular uses.”170
This qualification has survived notwithstanding the evolution of
the Court’s jurisprudence from merely permitting to expressly
requiring government aid be provided to religious organizations
“in instances where the government chooses to fund comparable
secular recipients.”171 The PPP appears to offer financial aid to a
wide range of organizations, religious and nonreligious, and
manifests the secular purpose of providing broad economic
assistance so that small businesses could retain, rehire, and pay
their employees.172 Nevertheless, the PPP funds provided to
religious organizations were not required to be put to secular use,
nor were there any “safeguards” in the legislation itself to ensure
the loans would not be used to support ideological activities.173
In contrast, under the PPP, taxpayer money was not only
permitted to be used for intrinsically religious purposes—the
program required that the funding cover salary expenses for clergy

167

See id. An important feature of church taxes in the founding era was “that they
involved taxes earmarked for religious entities at collection, rather than generic taxes
paid into the general treasury.” Id. However, “the fact that taxes were sometimes
earmarked for religious recipients was not in itself sufficient to trigger this objection.”
Id. Indeed, “where the eventual expenditure was aimed exclusively at financing
religion, an earmark may not have been necessary.” Id.
168
Id. at 169; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 61, at 930 (arguing that “an
‘establishment,’ . . . encompassed any tax monies given directly to a religious
institution, whether designated by the state or by the taxpayer’s choice.”).
169
See Laycock, supra note 99, at 142–43.
170
Storslee, supra note 42, at 114.
171
Id. at 115; see also Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020).
172
See BRANNON, supra note 3, at 2, 4.
173
Contra Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 861 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“The safeguards employed by the program are constitutionally sufficient. At a federal
level, the statute limits aid to ‘secular, neutral, and nonideological services’ . . . .”).
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if the loans were to be forgivable.174 The Court has already
determined that providing funding to teach a student to lead a
congregation is one such use of governmental financial assistance
that may be proscribed by the Establishment Clause.175 If
“[t]raining someone to lead a congregation is an essentially
religious endeavor,” 176 for which funding is impermissible, surely
subsidizing the salaries of clergy, who are already engaged in
leading congregations, is similarly an unconstitutional use of
taxpayer funds. The Court has also noted the potential dangers to
civil liberties that stem from supporting the clergy with public
funds, and providing taxpayer money to pay clergy salaries
remains a “historic and substantial” interest.177 There are likely
few areas where “antiestablishment interests come more into
play.”178 Thus, the PPP commanded that taxpayer money support
the essentially religious endeavors of clergy in direct
contravention of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
precedent.
It appears that the SBA contemplated Trinity Lutheran’s
nondiscrimination and religious status-based reasoning179 when it
determined that no organization would be disqualified from
receiving a PPP loan based solely on its religious nature, identity,
or speech.180 However, reliance on Trinity Lutheran is unavailing
and reflects an incomplete interpretation of the Court’s current
Establishment Clause doctrine.181 In reaching its holding in
Trinity Lutheran, the Court expressly distinguished providing
government financial assistance on the basis of religious status

174

See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004).
176
Id.
177
See id. at 722–23, 725.
178
Id. at 722.
179
The Court had not yet decided Espinoza when the SBA released its FAQ
Document on April 3, 2020, so the determination on the constitutionality of the
eligibility requirements was likely based on Trinity Lutheran as the most recent
precedent. Nevertheless, Espinoza was decided along Trinity Lutheran’s lines, and
likely would not change this analysis. See Bindas, supra note 149, at 208.
180
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 3–4; see also Tebbe et al., supra note 160. When the
SBA waived “its normal rules prohibiting aid for religious activities,” it “relied
implicitly but unmistakably on a reading of the First Amendment that not only
permits cash aid to houses of worship for core religious activities, but requires the
government to pay for those activities.” Id.
181
See supra pp. 116–18; see BRANNON, supra note 3, at 5 (“Locke and Trinity
Lutheran suggest that the government might still be able to prohibit federal funds
from being used for religious activities.”).
175
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from offering such funding for religious use.182 In its inconspicuous
but critical footnote, the Court reserved the possibility that it
would hold government funds put to religious use as
impermissible.183 The Court’s recent Espinoza decision also
affirmed the Court’s reliance on the distinction between religious
status and religious use.184 Thus, while an organization may not
be discriminated against because of its religious character—for
being a church—government financial assistance used for
fundamentally religious functions and activities may be denied.185
Religious organizations do not have unrestricted budgetary
freedom upon receipt of governmental funding.186 The funding
must be for some activity that falls within a neutrally funded
secular category, and not inherently religious endeavors.187
In a conclusory statement after noting that nonprofit entities
could receive PPP loans and that the CARES Act established their
eligibility without regard to provision of secular social services, the
SBA appropriated that same logic and misapplied it to religious
organizations.188 The SBA’s decision indicating that religious
organizations were eligible for PPP loans regardless of whether
they offered secular social services189 immediately raises
heightened Establishment Clause concerns.
Government
financial assistance cases since Everson have involved evaluating
religiously neutral funding provided to private, secular activities,
ranging from education to playground resurfacing.190 Funding
secular activities, like education, was a public good that even the
Framers endorsed.191 And in each of the modern Supreme Court

182

Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022–23 (2017) (“Davey
was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship
because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here
there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what
it is—a church.”).
183
Id. at 2024 n.3; Laycock, supra note 99, at 157–58 (arguing that the footnote
in Trinity Lutheran “reserves the question of religious uses, including mixed religious
and secular uses.”).
184
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (2020) (“This case
also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use.”); Barclay, supra note
147, at 1713–14; Lipez, supra note 139, at 375 (suggesting that the Court will address
the status-use distinction at a later date).
185
Barclay, supra note 147, at 1713–14 n.107; see Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
186
Laycock, supra note 99, at 157–58.
187
Id.
188
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 13, at 1.
189
Id.
190
Laycock, supra note 99, at 143.
191
See Storslee, supra note 42, at 119, 150.
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cases, taxpayer money funded secular services, primarily
education, in religious environments—not purely religious
activities and programs.192 Taxpayer money granted to churches
for their religious functioning and “to support church leaders” with
no regard for the secular services that they may or may not
provide, is the “hallmark[ ] of an ‘established’ religion.”193
Moreover, even in viewing the PPP as an indirect funding
program guided by private choice, 194 such an indirect provision of
federal taxpayer money to religious organizations would not pass
constitutional muster. Under the PPP, the SBA guaranteed loans
made by third-party lenders, namely large financial institutions
and banks.195 The banks, and not the SBA, remitted the loans to
the eligible recipients and served as ostensible intermediaries
between the government and the religious organizations.196 An
attempt to analogize the PPP to previous cases involving indirect
government funding to religious organizations, however, is
misguided. One cannot sincerely argue that the executives at
banks—tasked with dispensing billions of dollars to churches
across the country upon a grant of authority from the SBA—
possessed the same independent “private choice” afforded to
parents deciding where to spend a voucher and send their children
to school.197 It is unlikely that the individual bankers could
conceivably “exercise genuine choice among options public and
private, secular and religious” 198 when distributing billions of
dollars to churches and other religious organizations. Therefore,
the PPP as applied to religious organizations is not a program of
“true private choice”; rather, it is a program which “carries with it
the imprimatur of government endorsement.”199
Further, because the link between government and religion
was not attenuated by true private choice,200 the advancement of a
religious mission was not “incidental.”201 The federal government
itself paid the salaries of clergy, whose primary responsibility is to
advance religious missions in churches, not religious schools or
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Laycock, supra note 40, at 276.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004).
BRANNON, supra note 3, at 4.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–54 (2002).
Id. at 662.
Id. at 653, 655.
Contra Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020).
Contra Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
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related social service programs.202 Providing up to $3.5 billion to
the U.S. Catholic Church did not evince an “incidental”
This
advancement at all—it was a direct endorsement.203
endorsement of a religious message is reasonably attributable not
to the individual executives who remitted the funds, but rather to
the federal government. The extraordinary sum of money
provided to the U.S Catholic Church perhaps indicates not only an
endorsement, but also a hierarchical and structural favoritism
between religious and secular organizations, as well as among
other religious organizations.204 The government’s exceptional
dispensation, evidencing partiality toward the Catholic Church,
was worth billions of dollars.205 Thus, an argument espousing an
analogy between indirect government funding of religious schools
and “indirect” government subsidizing of billions of dollars to pay
clergy salaries must fail.
Even in cases where the Court has allowed indirect funding of
religious organizations, independent choices made by private
individuals do not “bypass the fundamental constitutional rule
against special funding for the religious functions of churches.”206
As such, it is immaterial that bankers at JPMorgan Chase
remitted over $7 million to the Archdiocese of New York.207 At
issue is the impermissible use of taxpayer money to fund
inherently religious activities. Accordingly, regardless of how the
money arrived at the religious organizations—whether directly
from the government or through an intermediary bank—the PPP
funds for clergy salaries were put to an inherently religious use.
The Court has never before considered the question presented
by the PPP funding, and the grant of billions of dollars to the U.S.
Catholic Church, explicitly intended to pay for clergy members’
salaries, is unprecedented.208 Surely given the well-defined
“historic and substantial”209 interest at issue, the government
retains a compelling reason for denying funds for the employment
of clergy and staff whose principal responsibility is to teach,

202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Schwartzman et al., supra note 20, at 3–4.
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5.
Schwartzman et al., supra note 20, at 2, 4.
Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 5.
Laycock, supra note 99, at 157.
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 26.
Schwartzman et al., supra note 20.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
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indoctrinate, advocate, and advance religious missions.210 Thus,
the PPP impermissibly contravened the fundamental
constitutional principle of prohibiting government funding for the
religious functions of churches by providing taxpayer money to
finance clergy members’ salaries.
CONCLUSION
The government’s dispensation of billions of taxpayers’ dollars
to Catholic churches, intended to subsidize clergy members’
salaries, violated the Establishment Clause.
Providing
government money to clergy is a boundary that the federal
government has never before crossed, and the PPP should elicit
from the Court strict scrutiny of the financial assistance program,
as applied to religious organizations. Moreover, for a Court that
has relentlessly relied on historical evidence in formulating its
myriad approaches to Establishment Clause challenges,
upholding the PPP would represent a glaring, exceptional effort
that would bulldoze any part of the wall that remains standing
between churches and state. A democratic government demands
“religious agnosticism—a renunciation of the idea that any
majority is permitted to define and enforce any set of absolute
political or religious truths.”211 Going forward, “any interpretation
of the Establishment Clause that would permit” even “a
mild . . . theocratic government would also contradict the basic
structure of democracy, as set forth in the Constitution.”212

210
See Schwartzman et al., supra note 20 (arguing that if the PPP funding rules
“are constitutional, even as they allow more direct financial support for churches than
at any other point in American history, then the establishment clause has lost its
meaning.”). See also BRANNON, supra note 3, at 1.
211
Gey, supra note 37, at 727–28.
212
Id. at 727.

